Link to site: Bob Marshall, Staff writer, March 17, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- The combination of forces that brought the structure down was its finding that one of the main triggers for that failure -- extremely low soil strengths under the toe of the levee -- would have been detected had the design team done soil borings in that area
- "The factor of safety would have been (low enough) to where they would have changed the design,"
- The task force said rising water pushed the wall away from the canal, eventually creating a crack, separating the wall from the canal-side levee. Water pressure building inside the crack began pushing down on soil layers under the wall, which required support from the levee on the land side of the canal and the soils adjacent to it. The weak soils beneath the toe of the levee couldn't stand up to the rising pressure and began slipping, bringing the levee and the floodwall down.


The key to learning why the 17th Street Canal floodwall failed during Hurricane Katrina may lie more in what designers didn't do than in what they could have foreseen, experts now say.

Lost in the controversy swirling around a government panel's comment last week that the designers of the floodwall could not have anticipated the combination of forces that brought the structure down was its finding that one of the main triggers for that failure -- extremely low soil strengths under the toe of the levee -- would have been detected had the design team done soil borings in that area, an official with the Army Corps of Engineers said Thursday.

Had the weakness at the toe of the levee been included in the analysis system used by the project designers, "The factor of safety would have been (low enough) to where they would have changed the design," said Reed Mosher, a researcher at the corps' Engineering Research and Development Center in Vicksburg, Miss., and a member of the corps-sponsored Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force that is investigating the failures. The options considered probably would have included a T-wall, or a much larger levee, he said.

The task force said rising water pushed the wall away from the canal, eventually creating a crack, separating the wall from the canal-side levee. Water pressure building inside the crack began pushing down on soil layers under the wall, which required support from the levee on the land side of the canal and the soils adjacent to it. The weak soils beneath the toe of the levee couldn't stand up to the rising pressure and began slipping, bringing the levee and the floodwall down.

Review team members said the designers did "few if any" soil borings at the toe of the levee, a finding John Greishaber, acting chief of the engineering division at the corps' New Orleans district, said was not normal. He said his office normally required designers to take borings at the center line as well as at the toe of levees.

"This is the preferred method," he said. "There are items when this is not done. You have to get into specifics (for each case) as to why it is not."

Greishaber said that when borings aren't made, engineers can estimate the soil strengths at the toe of a levee.

Engineers use a standard formula for estimating the soil strengths at the toe based on the known strength of soils at the center line of the levee, where the soil strengths are highest. That means soil borings at the toe usually aren't necessary unless the center line values are below a certain threshold, task force members said.

And that is where the designers made obvious mistakes, said J. David Rogers, a professor at the University of Missouri-Rolla who is a leading expert on levee failures and a member of a National Science Foundation investigation into the disaster.

"Looking at their calculations on the slope stability analysis, they used the same high figure from the center of the levee and projected it out to the toe, without any diminution in value," Rogers said. "That was one of the first things we picked up when we started working on this.

"When we tried to find out what factor they used for diminution with increasing distance from the toe, it didn't appear they used any. They were using maximum strength all the way to the toe. That's the part everyone will take issue with."

More surprising, Rogers said, is the fact that obvious mistake was missed by the corps in New Orleans, as well as its superiors in Vicksburg.

"I can't explain how this went through," he said.

Making waves

Although the quality of the engineering done by local firms and reviewed by the corps has been the focus of scrutiny since shortly after the walls collapsed, it was pushed from the headlines last week when the task force released an interim report identifying how the walls collapsed and saying the combination of forces responsible could not have been anticipated by the project designers. That provoked criticism from independent investigators.

But this week Ed Link, project director for the task force, said his panel's statements had been misconstrued by the media.

"Our position on this is that, very simply, whoever did the design just did not consider this particular mechanism," said Link, a University of Maryland senior fellow who is head of the corps-sponsored Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force. "We, IPET, made no value judgment whether it should have been considered or could have been considered.

"If that was inferred by our comments, it was inaccurate."

Link added that the corps has made no attempt to interfere or steer the investigation by the panel, which lists more than 150 members from academia, private industry and other state and federal agencies.

"The only pressure the corps has put on us is to find out what has happened and put it in the public domain," he said. "I'm telling you as an engineer, as a professional, I would not work in this environment if I felt there was anything political or adverse pressure on what we are doing."

The executive summary of the task force report, which Link said he wrote without input from the corps, said "this failure mechanism was not anticipated by the design criteria used."

When task force panelists and corps engineers were asked if that meant the design systems used by the engineers of the day could not have foreseen this type of failure, they answered "yes."

Link said that while the individual components of the failure are well documented as concerns for engineers doing stability analysis of levees and floodwalls, the combination of those factors coming together at the same time is not. He also said methods of analysis used by engineers at the time would not have included all those factors in testing a design for stability.

Point of contention

Task force panelists at the press conference also said a "search of the literature" turned up no examples of this specific failure mechanism.

Those claims were quickly challenged by members of the engineering community. Most notably Ray Seed and Bob Bea, University of California-Berkeley professors and members of the National Science Foundation team investigating the levee failures, issued a response calling the task force statements "unfortunate" and inaccurate. They called attention to a 1986 report done by the corps, known as the E-99 report, that showed the separation -- "tension cracking" -- of the wall as well as the build-up of high pressure at the base of the floodwall after the cracking.

They also cited two 1997 papers published in an industry journal analyzing the 1986 test. One of papers' authors was Mosher, who is a member of the task force.

Link said Thursday that his reference to the "literature" meant a review of the corps engineering manuals, which design teams are required to use.

"We were looking at the design criteria to see if there was a process like this described in the corps' design manuals that (the design team) missed," he said. "We didn't see anything that described this mechanism, that would have alerted (the design team) to look for this when doing their analysis."

Link and Mosher disagreed with Bea and Seed's analysis of the importance of the 1986 study. Mosher, who analyzed the E-99 report, said it was not designed to look at levee stability, but at how much a sheet pile "moved at the top as water increased."

The fact that the test also showed there was evidence of tension cracking and high pressure at the toe of the wall was not given much attention at the time, Mosher said, "because the study was not designed to look at the stability of the levee." He also said the evidence of cracking and increased pressure was minimal.

Rethinking strategies

Mosher said Katrina has made the report important today.

"When I go back now and look at E-99 knowing the other pieces of information about the 17th Street failure, I can make a better interpretation of what's in E-99," he said. "Now I can say I understand how all this relates."

Mosher and Link said the lessons learned from the investigation already are being put to work.

"We're going back and doing borings at the toes of the levees in the system anywhere we think this failure mechanism might be present," he said. "We're already doing re-evaluations of the stability analysis done by the (original design teams).

"Now that we know what to look for, we're out there looking for it."

. . . . . . .

Bob Marshall can be reached at rmarshall@timespicayune.com or (504) 826-3539.

Link to site: Bob Marshall, Staff writer, March 11, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- Unique combination of stresses that engineers could not have predicted caused the 17th Street Canal floodwall to fail and flood thousands of homes and businesses during Hurricane Katrina, according to an interim report of the task force investigating the disaster for the Army Corps of Engineers.
- Evidence points to forces that came together in a combination unique to the science and thus could not have been anticipated by the system's design teams.
- Interagency task force members said experiments with sophisticated computer models show the 17th Street Canal floodwall came down in a four-step process:

A unique combination of stresses that engineers could not have predicted caused the 17th Street Canal floodwall to fail and flood thousands of homes and businesses during Hurricane Katrina, according to an interim report of the task force investigating the disaster for the Army Corps of Engineers.

The report also points to soil subsidence that left floodwalls and levees lower than design specifications as contributing to the other failures and breaches that helped flood 80 percent of New Orleans and killed more than 1,100 residents in August.

Although independent analysts have blamed the 17th Street Canal failure on faulty engineering, including flawed soil investigations by local firms, the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, composed of experts from academia and industry as well as state and federal agencies, said evidence points to forces that came together in a combination unique to the science and thus could not have been anticipated by the system's design teams.

"I would say it's certainly going to come as a surprise to many people, if not most people," said Ed Link, University of Maryland professor and task force project director.

The group said the causes of the London Avenue canal floodwall collapses are not yet known and emphasized that its findings are preliminary.

Bob Bea, a University of California professor who is part of a National Science Foundation investigation into the failures, said the task force's explanation of the 17th Street Canal breach is lacking.

"It's our jobs as engineers to anticipate the failure points, and when that doesn't happen, breakdowns like this occur," Bea said, emphasizing that he is speaking only for himself and not the NSF team. "The corps has a documented history where they say, 'We couldn't have anticipated this, therefore it was an act of God.'

"An experienced engineer knows he can't accept that."

Four steps to hell

Interagency task force members said experiments with sophisticated computer models show the 17th Street Canal floodwall came down in a four-step process:

-- As water in the canal rose to 10 feet -- an unprecedented but not unplanned height -- the pressure from the water and wind-driven waves in the canal began to push, or deflect, the concrete floodwall and its subsurface supporting steel sheet piling away from the canal and toward Lakeview.

-- The deflection created space between the wall and the levee on the canal side.

-- Such flexing is expected by designers, as is a small opening between the wall and the levee. But what happened in this case, and was not expected, was the separation extended the entire length of the sheetpile wall to 17.5 feet below sea level. Water rushed into this opening quickly, creating a channel separating the floodwall from the levee on the inside of the canal and allowing high water pressure to travel directly down to the soil layers beneath the wall.

-- The final blow came when a layer of clay about 15 feet below sea level that extended beyond the toe of the levee began slipping toward Lakeview, causing the levee to collapse and the wall with it.

'Failure mechanism'

The fatal flaw in the weak soils beneath the structure was not the now-notorious layer of peat widely cited by independent analysts for months, the task force said. In fact, the failure surface, as engineers call it, did not occur under the levee or canal, but at a level beneath the toe of the levee and in the yards of homes adjacent to the canal.

Link said task force tests showed the soil-strength estimates done by local firm Eustis Engineering when the walls were built proved to be more conservative than actual results. Further, he said there was no method of testing the plans for a combination of forces that caused the collapse -- called the "failure mechanism" by engineers.

"We've searched the literature and found nothing that resembles this," he said. "I'm not saying nothing exists, but so far we haven't found it."

There was disagreement on that point.

Bea said a 1986 corps study showed such separations could occur.

"That report was done by the Vicksburg (Miss.) research station for the New Orleans District, but there's no evidence it ever made its way to the (engineering) firms doing the work," said Bea, who added that a full discussion of the report would be in the National Science Foundation study to be published next month.

Corps officials acknowledged the report, titled "E-99 Sheet Pile Wall Field Load Test Report," but disputed Bea's interpretation.

Neither the interagency task force nor the corps dismissed the long-standing criticism that sheet pilings should have been driven at least to the bottom of the canals -- a standard engineering practice -- rather than stopped at 17 feet. While they agreed deeper pilings generally make stronger walls, they have yet to run simulations to determine whether deeper pilings would have prevented this collapse given the other conditions now known.

Sinking floodwalls

Soil subsidence levels in a region that was largely marsh and swamp fewer than 100 years ago is well known, but the rate of sinkage, which left many structures below the heights built to guard against storm surges, apparently took the panel by surprise. For example, the Industrial Canal floodwall that was built to 15 feet actually measured just above 12 feet when Katrina hit, a loss of 2.7 feet.

Task force teams "documented that many sections of the levees and floodwalls were substantially below their original design elevations, an effective loss in protection," the report said.

Corps officials said the Bush administration has budgeted almost $3 billion to repair and restore all levees and floodwalls in the region up to design heights during the next two years.

Louisiana State University professor Ivor van Heerden, a member of the state team investigating the failures, said he was not surprised by the report and generally agreed with its findings. He said the corps started using updated elevation data only five years ago, even though the state had been urging a change for years.

"So the fact that the corps have found some levees lower than they should be reflects local subsidence but also that they built them lower than they should be because they would not update their datum," van Heerden commented by e-mail. "It is cheaper to make a wall 12.8 feet tall rather than one 14 feet tall!"

Further, van Heerden wrote, "whether the fail plane (on the 17th Street Canal) was in peat or clay is really academic. The structure underwent catastrophic structure failure, the same for the two breaches on the London Avenue Canal."

Hassan Mashriqui, an engineer and storm modeler at the LSU Hurricane Center, said he would be cautious about estimates of wave forces inside the 17th Street Canal because his findings show that a huge pile of debris that stacked up against the Old Hammond Highway bridge across the canal probably blocked much of that force.
Bob Marshall can be reached at rmarshall@timespicayune.com or (504) 826-3539.

Link to site: March 7, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- Federal engineers in Vicksburg have begun tests to determine exactly what caused the levees to fail in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina.
- Engineers want to learn what part waves played in breaching a floodwall on the 17th Street Canal, where Hurricane Katrina's storm surge pushed water from Lake Pontchartrain and where water poured into the city after the storm hit

VICKSBURG, Miss. (AP) - Federal engineers in Vicksburg have begun tests to determine exactly what caused the levees to fail in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina.

Engineers on Sunday gathered to watch a centrifuge spin a tiny model of the 17th Street Canal.

Wayne Stroup, a spokesman for the Engineering Research and Development Center's Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory, said more tests may be conducted later this week on a 14,000-square-foot model about a third the size of a football field.

Engineers want to learn what part waves played in breaching a floodwall on the 17th Street Canal, where Hurricane Katrina's storm surge pushed water from Lake Pontchartrain and where water poured into the city after the storm hit on Aug. 29.

Stroup said the larger model will be flooded with water. Engineers will use data, along with that from the centrifuge and other tests, to draw conclusions.

The work is part of the Corps' Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, which is investigating why levees and floodwalls in the New Orleans area failed during Katrina. The task force commissioned the work in Vicksburg under the auspices of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

The centrifuge, similar to those used in astronaut training to test the effects of increasing gravity, is three stories below ground.

It was manufactured in France and installed at the federal research station in Vicksburg more than 10 years ago. It remains one of the largest in the world.

Link to site: Matthew Brown, West Bank bureau, March 06, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- Six months after Katrina, the mark left on the natural world by last year's blockbuster hurricane season is a complex mix of more fish and shrimp, less habitat for them to live and breed in, and millions of gallons of oil possibly lost forever in south Louisiana's marshes.
- In terms of habitat, however, the storms sharply accelerated a coastal erosion problem already responsible for a decades-long decline in seafood production. And a lasting stain was left by at least nine major oil spills and countless hazardous-material containers strewn from Mississippi to Texas.
- Meanwhile, federal and state biologists report stocks of shrimp, fish and crabs are at their highest levels in years: a phenomenon attributed to a combination of lighter fishing pressure and a jolt of nutrients stirred up by the storms that served to stimulate the food chain.

Six months after Katrina, the mark left on the natural world by last year's blockbuster hurricane season is a complex mix of more fish and shrimp, less habitat for them to live and breed in, and millions of gallons of oil possibly lost forever in south Louisiana's marshes.

The central Gulf Coast was spared the massive fish kills that followed Hurricane Andrew in 1992. While some die-offs occurred, evidence has emerged of a spike in the populations of several saltwater species -- perhaps a result of the region's shattered fishing fleet.

In terms of habitat, however, the storms sharply accelerated a coastal erosion problem already responsible for a decades-long decline in seafood production. And a lasting stain was left by at least nine major oil spills and countless hazardous-material containers strewn from Mississippi to Texas.

Just as significant, however, is what the storms did not do. Federal scientists say the 224 billion gallons of foul floodwaters pumped out of New Orleans after the storms quickly dissipated in Lake Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico.

Researchers from the Battelle Seattle Research Center in Seattle, who attempted to mimic the floodwater's movement through computer simulations, have suggested much of the pumped-out water may be trapped in Lake Borgne. But extensive analyses of potential contaminants in seafood by state and federal fisheries scientists have turned up only trace amounts of chemicals such as PCBs and petroleum.

That contrasts sharply with news reports that continue to depict a grimmer situation. As recently as December, an article appearing in the Orlando Sentinel described the pumped-out floodwaters as a "slug of germs and chemicals . . . floating toward Florida's coast, drifting out to the Atlantic or lurking somewhere in between."

"By and large, the facts don't necessarily follow a lot of the speculation that was out there early, in terms of the chemicals that were out there and the threat to human health," said Steven Murawski, a senior scientist at the National Marine Fisheries Service, which has conducted nine rounds of seafood sampling from Texas to Florida.

Meanwhile, federal and state biologists report stocks of shrimp, fish and crabs are at their highest levels in years: a phenomenon attributed to a combination of lighter fishing pressure and a jolt of nutrients stirred up by the storms that served to stimulate the food chain.

Louisiana's inland waterways still are recovering from localized fish kills, but the scope of that damage is considered far narrower than the estimated 184 million fish that died in the Atchafalaya Basin during Hurricane Andrew.

Excess oxygen caused by heavy loads of organic material entering rivers after flooding caused fish kills along the Blind, Amite and Tchefuncte rivers after Katrina. Toward the coast, additional fish kills caused by an influx of saltwater were reported near Venice and Caernarvon in the southeast corner of the state, in the Atchafalaya Basin in south-central Louisiana and in Grand Lake and White Lake in the southwest, said John Roussel, assistant secretary for the Wildlife and Fisheries Department.

Plans are being made to restock the waterways with bass, catfish, bream and other species. For Grand and White lakes, however, Roussel said salinity levels -- the amount of salt in the water -- are still too high, keeping fish from returning and also threatening to kill off aquatic plants.

The direst story emerges from the physical toll the storm took on Louisiana's wetlands. Louisiana's coastal marshes comprise about 80 percent of the Gulf's wetlands, estuary systems that are vital for reproduction of shrimp, redfish, speckled trout, blue crabs, bluefish, menhaden and many other recreationally and commercially important species. The wetlands also serve as a natural buffer against hurricanes.

Rita and Katrina washed away or flooded about 118 square miles of wetlands, or about 75,500 acres.

Beyond those losses, oil spills caused by Katrina totaled 8 million gallons across southeast Louisiana, according to the Coast Guard. The most publicized spill, about 1 million gallons at the Murphy Oil refinery in St. Bernard Parish, occurred in a residential area. The rest were concentrated in rural areas or along the Mississippi River.

More than 2.3 million gallons of spilled oil have not been recovered.

As for other hazardous substances displaced by the storms, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has collected almost 4,200 tons of materials in 2.2 million hazardous material containers, from gasoline cans to drums of highly toxic industrial chemicals. That includes 675,000 containers from the coastal parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Lafourche and Vermilion and from Grand Isle in Jefferson Parish.

But many containers, as well as fishing boats and vehicles laden with fuel, were likely lost in marshes or water bottoms, state and federal officials have said. And in western Louisiana, about 1,400 hazardous-materials containers with up to 350,000 gallons of liquids and gases remain out of the EPA's reach.

The containers were found in the federally operated Sabine National Wildlife Refuge. Under the Stafford Act, which is driving the federal response to the recovery, that makes them off-limits to retrieval by agencies under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA emergency money can be spent only on state and local needs, according to EPA spokeswoman Cynthia Fanning.

. . . . . . .

Matthew Brown can be reached at mbrown@timespicayune.com or (504) 826-3784.

Link to site: Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer, March 6, 2006; Page A01

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- Experts monitoring the $1.6 billion reconstruction project say large sections of the rebuilt levee system will be substantially weaker than before the hurricane hit.
- These experts say the Corps, racing to rebuild 169 miles of levees destroyed or damaged by Katrina, is taking shortcuts to compress what is usually a years-long construction process into a few weeks.
- And they say the Corps is deferring repairs to flood walls that survived Katrina but suffered structural damage that could cause them to topple in a future storm.


NEW ORLEANS -- The Army Corps of Engineers seems likely to fulfill a promise by President Bush to rebuild New Orleans's toppled flood walls to their original, pre-Katrina height by June 1, but two teams of independent experts monitoring the $1.6 billion reconstruction project say large sections of the rebuilt levee system will be substantially weaker than before the hurricane hit.

These experts say the Corps, racing to rebuild 169 miles of levees destroyed or damaged by Katrina, is taking shortcuts to compress what is usually a years-long construction process into a few weeks. They say that weak, substandard materials are being used in some levee walls, citing lab tests as evidence. And they say the Corps is deferring repairs to flood walls that survived Katrina but suffered structural damage that could cause them to topple in a future storm.

Louisiana State University researcher Ezra Boyd examines a crack in a flood wall in Jefferson Parish, west of New Orleans. Scientists say many levees that survived Hurricane Katrina are compromised and may fail in another storm. (By Joby Warrick -- The Washington Post)
Graphic
Levee Rebuilding: Ready or Not?
The Army Corps of Engineers is racing to rebuild 41 miles of broken levees and patch up damage along an additional 128 miles before the hurricane season officially starts June 1. But some independent experts are questioning whether New Orleans's hurricane-protection system will be truly ready.

The Corps strongly disputes the assertion -- by engineers from a National Science Foundation-funded panel and a Louisiana team appointed to monitor the rebuilding -- that substandard materials are being used in construction. Agency officials maintain that the new levees are rigorously inspected at each step. But they acknowledge that much more work will be needed after June 1, the beginning of hurricane season, and that the finished system still will not be strong enough to withstand a storm the magnitude of Katrina.

"The people of New Orleans need to get back to at least the level of hurricane protection we had before Katrina," Corps spokesman Jim Taylor said. "We were authorized to do that, and do it quickly. It's up to Congress to decide to take it to a higher level."

But Ivor van Heerden, a Louisiana State University engineering professor and leader of a state-appointed team of experts investigating the failure of the levee system during Katrina, charged that "the government is trying to create a sense of security that doesn't exist."

"What we have today," he added, "is a compromised levee system that failed during a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane. Absolutely nowhere are the levees ready to stand up to the same kind of test."

The Corps said several steps that could help the levee system survive a major hurricane will have to wait until next year. For example, systematic testing for weak soils beneath the levees will not be completed until 2007. Two of the most devastating flood wall breaches during Katrina have been blamed in part on weak, peatlike soils beneath the walls' foundations.

In addition, a plan to line the bases of certain critical levees with a protective layer of rock or concrete -- a process known as "armoring" -- is not expected to begin until summer, and then only if Congress provides additional money. Levee armoring significantly lowers the risk that a levee will collapse when it is overtopped by floodwaters.

A recent report by a prestigious panel of the American Society of Civil Engineers described the lack of armoring in New Orleans's levees as a "fundamental flaw" that demands urgent attention. The same report also faulted the Corps for making predictions about the system's safety before the agency officially determined what caused the levees to fail in the first place.

"Overtopping during Katrina caused catastrophic flooding and destruction of the levees themselves," said David E. Daniel, president of the University of Texas at Dallas and a member of the engineers panel. "It is inevitable that the levees will again be overtopped -- the only question is when."

Katrina breached the region's 350-mile levee system in dozens of places, blasting out huge chunks of concrete flood walls in central New Orleans and obliterating miles of earthen levees south and east of downtown. The breaches put 75 percent of New Orleans under water and transformed Katrina from a destructive but ordinary storm to a monumental disaster that claimed more than 1,300 lives.

The Bush administration has requested about $3.1 billion for repairing and strengthening the region's hurricane defenses. In addition to the $1.6 billion approved by Congress for rapid repairs to broken levees, the administration is seeking additional money for armoring, new floodgates and more pumping stations.

Link to site: Jim Motavalli, Green Living March, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- The Bush administration had other funding priorities. President Bush committed $22 million over five years to Army Corps of Engineers flood control efforts, but the Corps and the state of Louisiana had asked for five times that much.
- National Geographic report from 2004: “The Federal Emergency Management Agency lists a hurricane strike on New Orleans as one of the most dire threats to the nation, up there with a large earthquake in California or a terrorist attack on New York City. Even the Red Cross no longer opens hurricane shelters in the city, claiming the risk to its workers is too great.”
- The environmental community is anticipating that politicians will twist the oil shortage to their own ends.


In an interview with TV anchor Diane Sawyer, President Bush proclaimed confidently, “I don’t think anybody anticipated the breach of the levees.” The statement had about as much grounding in reality as one made a few days later by his mother, Barbara Bush, who was visiting Houston as part of Republican spin control and was favorably impressed with conditions inside the Astrodome: “And so many of the people in the arena here, you know, were underprivileged anyway, so this--this is working very well for them,” she said. As blogger Andrew Sullivan noted, it was her Marie Antoinette moment.

We knew not only that the levees could breach, but that they were likely to do so. We even knew what to do about it, but the Bush administration had other funding priorities. President Bush committed $22 million over five years to Army Corps of Engineers flood control efforts, but the Corps and the state of Louisiana had asked for five times that much. “For years, Congress has consistently approved far more for New Orleans-area projects than the White House has proposed,” said the San Jose Mercury News.

Absent such preparation, we knew what to expect. New Orleans' Time-Picayune ran an exhaustive series on the impending disaster. Here’s a brief excerpt from a National Geographic report from 2004: “The Federal Emergency Management Agency lists a hurricane strike on New Orleans as one of the most dire threats to the nation, up there with a large earthquake in California or a terrorist attack on New York City. Even the Red Cross no longer opens hurricane shelters in the city, claiming the risk to its workers is too great.”

The article quotes Joe Suhayda, a retired coastal engineer at Louisiana State: “The killer for Louisiana is a Category Three storm at 72 hours before landfall that becomes a Category Four at 48 hours and a Category Five at 24 hours--coming from the worst direction.”

Nobody anticipated a horrific flooding of New Orleans? Here’s National Geographic’s graphic but imaginary scenario from 2004, which was only too painfully realized. The actual storm differed only in details: “The water crept to the top of the massive berm that holds back [Lake Pontchartrain] and then spilled over. Nearly 80 percent of New Orleans lies below sea level--more than eight feet below in places--so the water poured in. A liquid brown wall washed over the brick ranch homes of Gentilly, over the clapboard houses of the Ninth Ward, over the white-columned porches of the Garden District, until it raced through the bars and strip joints on Bourbon Street like the pale rider of the Apocalypse. As it reached 25 feet (eight meters) over parts of the city, people climbed onto roofs to escape it.”

Here’s another warning, from the pages of Mike Tidwell’s newly timely Bayou Farewell: The Rich Life and Tragic Death of Louisiana’s Cajun Coast, published in 2003 by Pantheon. The state’s coastal wetlands, Tidwell pointed out, were disappearing at a rate of 25 square miles per year, meaning that “hundreds of Louisiana towns and cities, all just a few feet above sea level, lie increasingly prone to that deadly wrecking ball of hurricane force known as the storm surge. Coastal wetlands, it turns out, provide more than just a critical nursery for shrimp, crabs and fish. Every 2.7 miles of marsh grass absorbs a foot of a hurricane’s storm surge, that huge tide of water pushed inland by the storm’s winds. For New Orleans alone, hemmed in by levees and already on average eight feet below sea level, the apron of wetlands between it and the closest Gulf shore was, cumulatively, about 50 miles a century ago. Today that distance is perhaps 20 miles and shrinking fast. With very slow evacuation speed virtually guaranteed (there are only three major exit bridges that jump over the encircling levees for central New Orleans’ 600,000 people, it’s not implausible that a major hurricane approaching from the right direction could cause tens of thousands of deaths.”

We still don’t know the full human toll from Hurricane Katrina. The full extent of the environmental damage may be long in coming, too. Environmental reporters say the EPA has so far been unresponsive in providing an overview on oil spills, chemical releases, fires and other accidents. Tanks capable of holding two million barrels of oil were seen to be leaking into the Mississippi River near the Louisiana town of Venice, Reuters reported.

The oil industry was still largely out of commission at presstime, with 70 percent of normal oil production and half of natural gas output shut down. Twenty oil platforms were reported missing. Eight major refineries--vital to produce gasoline from crude oil, and already strained before the hurricane struck--were out of commission. As the Associated Press noted, the hurricane disabled 10 percent of U.S. refining capacity and “contributed to a surge in retail gasoline prices and spot shortages around the country.”

The environmental community is anticipating that politicians will twist the oil shortage to their own ends. New York Republican U.S. Senate candidate Jeanine Pirro called for a suspension of the federal gas tax, which would surely put more people on the road, increasing demand and exacerbating the problem. Calls to drill in Alaska weren't far behind. The Sierra Club’s David Willet: “Some members of Congress have already used Hurricane Katrina--which killed untold hundreds or thousands of people to advance their narrow political agenda. Now because Hurricane Katrina seriously affected the production, refinery capacity and price of oil in the United States, some in Congress are trying to use it as an excuse to renew calls to drill the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and our fragile coastlines. Have they no shame? Are they so bankrupt of ideas?”

The Chicago Tribune called the environmental after-effects of the storm a “creeping catastrophe,” though it noted that, according to early reports, the chemical plants and refineries to the south and east of New Orleans had mostly escaped serious damage. And of course, the floodwaters themselves were hardly benign. “Even before the storm hit, many of the region’s waterways were among the dirtiest in the nation,” the Tribune said. “Louisiana ranks fourth in the nation for releases of toxic chemicals into rivers and streams, and it leads the nation in releases of chemicals that persist in the environment and build up in the human body, according to government data.” There was concern about tetanus spreading through the area, and contaminated sediment being left behind when the floodwaters recede.

It wasn’t surprising that the media suddenly took an interest in Mike Tidwell’s prescient Bayou Farewell book. E spoke to an impassioned Tidwell in the midst of a barrage of calls from major news outlets:

TIDWELL: I think that the fact that the President can make a comment like “no one anticipated the breach of the levees” in New Orleans is all the evidence America needs to see how profoundly out of touch this President is with basic homeland security issues here in America. How can you have homeland security when you don’t have a home, like a million people along the Gulf Coast? How can you have homeland security when those people have no security whatsoever? How can you have homeland security when people can’t even afford to drive their cars because gas is $1.50 more a gallon?

Author of Bayou Farewell, Mike Tidwell.
This President says he didn’t know the levees could break, but his own administration was virtually besieged with urgent requests for levee restoration and building by the State of Louisiana and by New Orleans itself for years. They heard repeated urgent pleas for federal money contributed towards the $14 billion coastal restoration plan, which is a plan to reengineer the coast of Louisiana and recreate the islands and the wetlands that have disappeared. This President ignored or dramatically under-funded all requests for federal involvement in that plan.

So there is a paper trail that is as tall as Mount Everest. Governor Kathleen Blanco met with Bush just a few months after she was elected. She brought up three issues, the most important of them was that our coast is imploding, it’s disappearing, it’s outlandishly vulnerable to hurricanes. The President’s response was, “I’d like to help you as long as the science is sound.” And they then proceeded to do nothing. You know that same phrase “sound science” was used to do nothing about global warming, even though the science is irrefutable.

JIM MOTAVALLI: I edited the book <&src=QHA022" >Feeling the Heat: Dispatches from the Frontlines of Climate Change, which came out last year and details the global warming effects that are already underway and measurable. There’s a chapter that I wrote looking at barrier islands and what they do, and why we’re losing them because of global warming. It focuses on the vulnerability of the New Jersey and Florida coasts, which are doubly in danger because development has removed wetlands and housing extends right to the shore.

TIDWELL: I’m trying to bend the discussion towards climate change. I’ve been given a platform and, my God, every media outlet in the country is contacting me. I will be on MSNBC and CNN tonight, and NPR’s Morning Edition tomorrow morning. I owe a call to the Wall Street Journal. What I’m saying to them is that the same Bush administration that ignored the warnings about the levees in New Orleans also ignored the warning about the barrier islands and the wetlands buffering the coast in Louisiana. They did nothing, and now we have a million refugees and tens of thousands of people probably dead and who knows how much economic damage. Their negligent policy led to or contributed to this catastrophe. They’re now ignoring the same iron-clad data from their own agencies saying that climate change is real. And one of the impacts is going to be one to three feet of sea level rise in the 21st century.

If we continue to ignore these warnings, every coastal city in America and around the world could turn into a New Orleans. Whether the land sinks three feet in a century or the sea level rises three feet a century, you get the same effect. So if we want to know what Shanghai, Bombay, Miami and New York are all going to be like 50, 70 or 100 years from now, turn on your television right now: It’s on full graphic display.

MOTAVALLI: Let me just ask you one more question, because I know you have to go. What do you think really needs to be done not just to rebuild New Orleans, but to save it from another such tragedy?

TIDWELL: We can rebuild New Orleans: A lot of those structures are still there and can be either rebuilt or refurbished. We could rebuild the levees, and make them much bigger. We can do all that, but in my view it would be immoral and irresponsible to repair a single broken window or pick up a single piece of debris to repair a single cubic foot of levee without simultaneously committing to a full coastal restoration plan. You’ve got to repair the barrier islands at the same time that you fix the windows; you have to replenish the wetlands at the same time you drain New Orleans. To do one without the other is an invitation for another nightmare.

Link to Reference: Larry Wheeler, DEMOCRAT WASHINGTON BUREAU, 2/26/06

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- More disasters of Hurricane Katrina-proportions are a certainty because the United States has no policy to control growth in danger zones at the water's edge.
- The number of Americans living near the shore increased by 23.6 million between 1980 and 2005,
- The 3,000-square-mile Gulf of Mexico ''dead zone'' off the Texas-Louisiana coast is well-known. Aquatic life there has perished. Spawning has halted.

PART ONE OF TWO: GROWTH AND OUR SHORES

More disasters of Hurricane Katrina-proportions are a certainty because the United States has no policy to control growth in danger zones at the water's edge.

In a single generation, land along the nation's fragile coasts has been gobbled up, concentrating wealth at the shore, threatening the environment and putting at risk millions of people and property worth billions of dollars.

A three-month Gannett News Service examination found:

Already crowded retirement havens like Palm Beach have packed hundreds of thousands of newcomers into condos and homes overlooking the water.

About 23 percent of the nation's estuaries do not meet state and federal clean-water standards for swimming, fishing or supporting marine species.

Pollution-related closings and swimming advisories at U.S. beaches hit an all-time high in 2004.

The National Flood Insurance Program is $18 billion in debt and lacks the ability to repay the money it borrowed from the U.S. Treasury to cover property losses from hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

The communities around the Great Lakes - America's freshwater coast - still struggle with industrial pollution as they face continuing cleanup costs and the beginnings of revitalization.

In many seashore towns, commercial fishing and shipbuilding industries have been replaced by tourism-driven economies and lower wages.

Demand for waterfront property has driven home prices so high that workers who staff the shops, restaurants, schools and police departments can't afford to live nearby.

"If we kick this down the street, the crisis five years from now will be irreversible," said James Watkins, a retired Navy admiral who was chairman of the 2004 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy.

"We better get our act together," Watkins said.

Population growth

The number of Americans living near the shore increased by 23.6 million between 1980 and 2005, according to a Gannett News Service analysis of population trends in counties nearest to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes.

If runaway land consumption and relentless growth in automobile use continue unchecked, many healthy shore communities could face sharp declines over the next 25 years, according to Dana Beach, director of the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League and an authority on coastal sprawl.

Beach authored a report for the Pew Oceans Commission that concluded many coastal watersheds may trip from healthy to damaged over the next two decades unless coastal communities adopt growth policies that slow land consumption and minimize polluted runoff from impervious surfaces.

''Part of the dilemma is that there is vast ignorance across the country about ecology,'' Beach said. "When we modify watersheds (with roads and buildings) we are changing the physical attributes, the biological attributes of the water bodies embedded in those watersheds."

Estuaries and bays

Most coastal communities recognize their bays and estuaries are in severe decline.

The 3,000-square-mile Gulf of Mexico ''dead zone'' off the Texas-Louisiana coast is well-known. Aquatic life there has perished. Spawning has halted.

Texas officials are trying to prevent further loss of habitat by limiting development along the 367-mile coast through state and federal coastal and wetland protection programs, according to the state's Center for Policy Studies and Environmental Defense.

Hazardous bacterial contamination caused more than 20,000 closings and health advisory days at beaches across the country in 2004, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council most recent report.

That's the most since the environmental group began tracking 15 years ago, said Nancy Stoner, director of council's Clean Water Project. Some of the increase is due to greater monitoring.

In 2005, Gulf Coast beaches from Texas to Florida were hit with dangerous algae blooms and fouled by fish kills. The algae blooms have forced local governments to post ''No Swimming'' signs while dead fish have sullied the beaches.

Patchwork of programs

The federal government has a patchwork of regulations and agencies that focus on pollution, flood control, the environment and growth patterns.

Some federal efforts, like the National Flood Insurance Program and beach restoration projects run by the Army Corps of Engineers, contribute to the growth of waterfront communities.

The value of property covered by the flood program is $555 billion, more than five times what it was 25 years ago. It generates about $2 billion in annual revenues, mostly from premium payments.

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how a single disaster can overwhelm the flood program.

The federal government's lead agency on ocean and coastal issues now offers programs to help shore communities learn about the natural disasters that threaten their communities so they can make smarter decisions about growth.

However, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's budget has remained relatively flat since 2000, limiting the reach of its small teams of coastal specialists. The agency's budget for the current year is $3.86 billion, down 4 percent from 2005.

Nevertheless, NOAA has teamed up with experts at the Environmental Protection Agency to address the problem.

''Our role is to provide coastal communities with the best information possible so they can make informed decisions about where and how to grow,'' said Tim Torma, a manager of the environmental agency's Smart Growth Program.

Pricing workers out

But many beach communities are now playgrounds for the wealthy while the working class is pushed out.

Karen Krafft, a single mother with two children, is typical.

She can barely make ends meet living in Nags Head, N.C., on the annual salary of $25,000 she makes as a credit counselor. Her summer weekends are spent cleaning vacation homes to make more money.

Krafft's story is not unusual, said Charles Colgan, chief economist for NOAA's National Ocean Economics Program. Large job losses in traditional ocean industries like shipbuilding, offshore energy production and commercial fishing have been offset by the growth in tourism and recreation, Colgan said.

Before Katrina, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama had seen the nation's largest percent gains in coastal tourism and recreation employment.

However, average annual wages in these sectors ($16,321) were less than half the average U.S. wage ($34,647).

Others who have the financial means are reluctant to leave paradise even after repeated assaults from dangerous hurricanes.

"It's just a wonderful place to be," said Lee Shrewsbury, a Nashville, Tenn., businessman who owns a house on Pensacola Beach that was battered but not destroyed by Hurricane Ivan in 2004.

Solutions await action

In its final report, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy made more than 200 recommendations to highlight coastal issues and coordinate 11 Cabinet-level departments and four independent agencies that oversee some portion of the nation's ocean and coastal policy.

The ambitious agenda has received little attention from the White House or Congress. President Bush partially followed one recommendation and formed a Cabinet-level "Committee on Ocean Policy." The panel mostly serves as a clearinghouse for information on existing programs.

Contact Larry Wheeler at lwheeler@gns.gannett.com.

Originally published February 26, 2006

Link to Reference: Todd Horneck, Associate Editor, Feb 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- Water systems that are now operating and able to maintain pressure in their distribution systems are no longer being significantly affected by coliform bacteria.
- In some heavily flooded areas, local officials may postpone repairs to water systems pending their decisions on how and when rebuilding may proceed. Most small public water systems have been able to repair or replace damaged infrastructure.
- Water systems in Louisiana that have lost pressure below 15 psi are placed on boil-water advisories, and about a dozen public water systems, predominantly non-community systems, remain in boil-water advisory status, although most of the water systems in boil-water advisory status are not currently operating.

Summary: Six months after Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf region, many are still struggling with the aftermath. Blake Atkins, chief of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 6 Drinking Water Section, based in Dallas, TX, sat down with Water Technology in January to discuss the impact Katrina has had on water quality and treatment issues in the affected states and what the future holds.

Water Technology®: In rural areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, what were some of the most problematic contaminants that needed to be removed from the water to make it suitable for drinking?

Blake Atkins: In rural areas largely impacted by the hurricanes, coliform bacteria were the most prevalent and problematic contaminants. This was due to pressure loss in distribution systems.

Water systems that are now operating and able to maintain pressure in their distribution systems are no longer being significantly affected by coliform bacteria.

WT: At what point do you think most or all of the larger public water system infrastructures will be fully repaired in the region? How about small public systems or private wells?

BA: The larger public water systems have been able to repair impacted water treatment facilities to return them to operational status, and the vast majority of damaged distribution systems have been repaired.

In some heavily flooded areas, local officials may postpone repairs to water systems pending their decisions on how and when rebuilding may proceed. Most small public water systems have been able to repair or replace damaged infrastructure.

Some of the smaller public water systems associated with businesses that are no longer operating may never [be repaired or replaced].

WT: Are there any public systems still on boil-water orders?

BA: Water systems in Louisiana that have lost pressure below 15 psi are placed on boil-water advisories, and about a dozen public water systems, predominantly non-community systems, remain in boil-water advisory status, although most of the water systems in boil-water advisory status are not currently operating.

WT: Is federal financial assistance available to assist consumers or water treatment professionals to buy or repair treatment systems for individual homes or businesses? If so, how do they find out about it?

BA: FEMA s Public Assistance Program, which provides reimbursement funding to not-for-profit water systems, has funds for returning water infrastructure to pre-hurricane damage status. For-profit public water systems can apply to the Small Business Administration for loans.

WT: News reports about the hurricane s aftermath emphasized the large amounts of hydrocarbons, industrial chemicals, sewage, and other contaminants that the receding waters left on and in the ground. Will these pose long-term problems for treating groundwater in the region? Are you or other agencies making any special recommendations in this regard to consumers or treatment professionals?

BA: While some levels of contaminants were detected in floodwaters in the New Orleans area, water systems in that area rely on surface water treatment, and monitoring of treated water in these areas revealed no contaminants of concern. Most groundwater sources are located far from where chemical releases were possible, and fortunately, most of the groundwater sources are protected by geologic strata.

The US Geologic Survey intends to monitor some groundwater sources that are recharged by the north shore of Lake Pontchartrain, but no special recommendations have been made at this time. Hundreds of bacteriological samples were analyzed free of charge to private well owners, and private well owners were advised of disinfection and flushing procedures following a flood.

WT: What technical advice would you have for water treatment businesses in the Gulf region trying to help their customers restore or improve water supplies affected by the hurricane? Are there are any specific treatment methodologies that appear to have been particularly well suited for post-hurricane recovery?

BA: From a lessons-learned standpoint, water systems should focus on backup and contingency plans. Most water systems lost pressure and were subsequently placed on boil-water advisories due to power loss.

If these water systems had an emergency connection to another water system that was able to maintain pressure, or if these systems had their own backup power generators, most boil-water advisories would have been averted. Disinfection and flushing were the treatment methodologies that were most effective in returning water systems to safe operations.

WT: How would you assess the response of the water treatment industry so far to the problems caused by the hurricane?

BA: [It] could be characterized as generous. In order to help maintain public health protection, many vendors were offering equipment and services at reduced or no cost to water systems.

Link to Reference: Matthew Brown, West Bank bureau, February 06, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- 100 Louisiana oyster farmers facing hard times since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed their oyster reefs are headed back to the water, as newly minted state contractors charged with assessing the storms' long-term damage.
- The only money so far in the pipeline is $199 million from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Emergency Conservation Program. That money will be split between farmers and oyster growers across six states that had hurricanes in 2005: Louisiana, Texas, Florida, North Carolina, Alabama and Mississippi.
- Thousands of acres of oyster reefs were smashed by Katrina and Rita. The hurricanes also churned up millions of tons of silt in areas such as Lake Borgne and Black Bay. As the silt settled, it smothered about 60 percent of the shellfish crop east of the Mississippi.

More than 100 Louisiana oyster farmers facing hard times since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed their oyster reefs are headed back to the water, as newly minted state contractors charged with assessing the storms' long-term damage.

The work is a welcome change for the commercial fishers, who in many cases lost houses and boats on top of severe damage to the resource they depend on.

"It is more or less raining in a dry bucket for these fishermen to go out and do this. They can go out there and in a couple of weeks make 10 grand they didn't have," said Ricky Melerine, a St. Bernard Parish councilman coordinating the damage assessment in his parish.

Participants test the consistency of water bottoms using long poles, gathering information the state can use to decide where to rebuild reefs. The state Department of Wildlife and Fisheries is spending about $1.2 million on the program.

That pales against the $2.2 billion economic blow Louisiana's seafood industry suffered in the storms. And John Roussel, assistant secretary for fisheries, said his cash-strapped agency has little more to offer fishers unless the state's call for $700 million in federal fisheries assistance is answered.

The only money so far in the pipeline is $199 million from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Emergency Conservation Program. That money will be split between farmers and oyster growers across six states that had hurricanes in 2005: Louisiana, Texas, Florida, North Carolina, Alabama and Mississippi. The money will be split again among various agricultural interests, including oysters, poultry and swine, according to state and USDA officials.

"When you start breaking that $200 million amongst all those, I don't know what kind of share oysters might get," Roussel said.

Thousands of acres of oyster reefs were smashed by Katrina and Rita. The hurricanes also churned up millions of tons of silt in areas such as Lake Borgne and Black Bay. As the silt settled, it smothered about 60 percent of the shellfish crop east of the Mississippi.

"In some cases reefs that were there for 40, 50 years are not there anymore," said Port Sulphur oyster farmer Pete Vujnovich Jr.

The oyster grounds east of the river are some of the top oyster-producing areas in the country, accounting for about one-sixth of all oysters harvested nationwide annually. Historically, Louisiana oyster growers working 2.3 million acres of public and private leases have provided more than a third of the nation's oysters.

State officials are hoping the USDA money will pay for future efforts to rebuild ruined reefs, an expensive endeavor that involves laying down thousands of tons of limestone or broken oyster shells.

First, however, the oyster farmers have been asked to pinpoint exactly what areas are salvageable. That work already has begun in St. Bernard and is expected to begin this week in Plaquemines.

The oyster farmers are surveying 550 plots east of the Mississippi River. The state is paying $2,000 per plot, and each plot takes about two days to survey, according to participants.

Water-bottom hardness is gauged by sticking poles into the mud at 400 locations within each plot.

To provide suitable oyster habitat, the bottom must be hard enough so that new reef material does not sink. Tidal currents must be present to bring a steady flow of nutrients that oysters consume by filtering from the water.

"Right now we're going to have to concentrate on what Katrina left us to work with that's viable or that could be easily restored," Vujnovich said. "The places that took extensive damage, if we don't have any help, we're going to have take care of over the years. It will be a lifetime."

. . . . . . .

Matthew Brown can be reached at mbrown@timespicayune.com or at (504) 826-3784.

Link to Reference: Natalie Chambers, The Mississippi Press, February 01, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, told local officials that unless a spill is determined intentional or negligent, fines will not be assessed.
- During the 90-minute session, county supervisors repeatedly mentioned an inability to get straight answers from federal authorities, particularly on debris removal issues.
- "If we can improve the flow of monies, then certainly that would be better. As we all know that stream of money, from Federal Emergency Management Agency to Mississippi Emergency Management Agency then to reimburse us, that continues to be a bit of a nightmare and it is placing us all in a significantly restrictive financial capacity for what we are trying to accomplish,"

PASCAGOULA -- When Hurricane Katrina hit Jackson County on Aug. 29, it left Moss Point's lift stations battered. The city's inability to have total repairs in place has caused Mayor Xavier Bishop concern that an unavoidable spill could mean major fines for Moss Point.

Bishop was able to relax just a little Tuesday.

Phil Bass, head of the Office of Pollution Control for the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, told local officials that unless a spill is determined intentional or negligent, fines will not be assessed.

Jimmy Palmer, regional administrator of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 4, arranged the session to help local leaders find ways to resolve issues that are slowing the storm recovery process.

Palmer also told the group several industrial sites along the Gulf Coast -- including Rohm and Haas, Bayou Casotte, Fort Bienville and Dupont DeLisle -- have been tested for storm-related contaminants.

"So far, we've not found any evidence of any problem caused by Katrina," he said.

During the 90-minute session, county supervisors repeatedly mentioned an inability to get straight answers from federal authorities, particularly on debris removal issues.
"I think the most frustrating part has been the fact it's very difficult at times to nail down procedures," said Supervisor Manly Barton.

Barton said Hurricane Katrina has brought on a different level of response and anxiety.

When a personnel change is made, policy and procedure appear to change too, he said.

"What we got to do is to deal with a host of regulations that are out there that govern various things. One problem that you know very well is the asbestos issue," Palmer said.

Supervisor John McKay said the first four months after the storm, the county was able to knock down structures without problems. When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was replaced by a private debris contractor, more stringent requirements were put in place.

"Now, starting the fifth month, we have to have our contractor out there with a water hose wetting it down, in case we have asbestos in a building. We're not given enough inspectors to go out and inspect it, which would alleviate the problem of having to haul it to a different landfill. So the relaxed regulation now is to just assume it's there and take it to a middle-class landfill, not a hazardous waste (landfill), which costs the government a whole lot more money," McKay said.

Palmer said key to removal of a structure is it must be deemed "unsound and in danger of imminent collapse."

"Things get tricky though when there is building that's still structurally sound," he said.

Supervisor Frank Leach said after the storm, local governments were ill-prepared to deal with wastewater issues.

"Every lift station across this Coast, literally, being out of commission because they went under water. All those electronics and pumps became a nightmare. We were searching diligently for the right type of equipment," he said.

Trying to get small items, such as chlorine tables, was practically impossible, he said.

There is a need for a preventive plan or a way to have spare parts at one's disposal, he said.

Leach also told Palmer finances have become a roadblock to recovery.

"If we can improve the flow of monies, then certainly that would be better. As we all know that stream of money, from Federal Emergency Management Agency to Mississippi Emergency Management Agency then to reimburse us, that continues to be a bit of a nightmare and it is placing us all in a significantly restrictive financial capacity for what we are trying to accomplish," Leach said.

Bass said his agency also wants the recovery process to pick up speed.

"By the same token, we've got to be sure that proper procedures are being followed keeping the dust down and when it's disposed of, you're not putting it somewhere where 10 or 15 years later it's going to cause a bigger problem than it's causing today. We recognize too, with only three solid waste landfills in the six coastal counties, that those aren't going to be logistically located to handle this. So we looked at upgrades to Class 1 facilities and we are doing that with everyone that will apply and agrees to keep up with paperwork and special coverings," Bass said.

Bass said mechanisms are in place to accommodate as quick and inexpensive removal as possible.

Palmer said during the storm, a humanitarian effort took effect.

With five months post-Katrina and more auditing being done, Palmer said federal authorities are reticent because they know they are being monitored.

"It has taken a tremendous effort to just get basic utilities back up and going and we're very fortunate that we've gotten there now," Palmer said.

"Now we're shifting into the issues of continuing to clean up the mess, clean up debris. For months, we just tried to get the roads open so we could move ourselves around. Now we are moving into the difficult phase of just cleaning up the rubble and then taking down buildings that have got to come down. That presents a whole new set of issues," Palmer said.

Pascagoula officials sought an extension of deadlines for stormwater improvements and debris removal.

"They are stopped up and we're fixing to get into rainy season," said David Groves of Ocean Springs.

Ocean Springs Mayor Connie Moran asked why an environmental study would take two years if a drawbridge is selected to replace the existing damaged Biloxi Bay bridge.

Palmer said he will research the issue.

Reporter Natalie Chambers can be reached at nchambers@themississippipress.com or (228) 934-1429.

Link to Reference: CAIN BURDEAU, Associated Press, January 30, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- Everywhere scientists look, they see disrupted patterns in and along the Gulf of Mexico.
- Scientists say the future could be different. Nature might not be able to rebound so quickly. The reason: the human factor.
- Between 2004 and 2005, “we've basically demolished our coastline from Galveston (Texas) to Panama City, Fla.,” said Barry Keim, the state climatologist in Louisiana.

Last year's record hurricane season didn't just change life for humans. It changed nature, too.

Everywhere scientists look, they see disrupted patterns in and along the Gulf of Mexico. Coral reefs, flocks of sea birds, crab- and shrimp-filled meadows and dune-crowned beaches were wrapped up in — and altered by — the force of hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Dennis.

“Nothing's been like this,” said Abby Sallenger, a U.S. Geological Survey oceanographer, during a recent flight over the northern Gulf Coast to study shoreline changes.

For him, the changes are mind-boggling: Some barrier islands are nearly gone; on others, beaches are scattered like bags of dropped flour.

Hurricanes have been kneading the Gulf Coast like putty for eons, carving out inlets and bays, creating beaches and altering plant and animal life — but until now, the natural world has largely been able to rebound. Trees, marine life and shoreline features that tourists and anglers enjoyed in recent years were largely the same types as those that 17th-century buccaneers and explorers encountered.

But scientists say the future could be different. Nature might not be able to rebound so quickly. The reason: the human factor.

“Natural systems are resilient and bounce back,” said Susan Cutter, a geographer with the University of South Carolina. “The problem is when we try to control nature rather than letting her do what she does.”

The seas are rising, the planet is getting hotter, and commercial and residential development is snowballing. Add those factors to a predicted increase in nasty hurricanes and the result is a recipe for potentially serious natural degradation, some say.

“It may bring about a situation (in which) the change is so rapid, it's something that's very different from what the ecosystem experienced over the last three, four thousand years,” said Kam-biu Liu, a Louisiana State University professor and hurricane paleoscientist. “We may be losing part of our beaches, we may lose our coastal wetlands, and our coastal forests may change permanently to a different kind of ecosystem.”

Between 2004 and 2005, “we've basically demolished our coastline from Galveston (Texas) to Panama City, Fla.,” said Barry Keim, the state climatologist in Louisiana. “It's getting to the point that we might have to rethink what our coastal map looks like.”

Surveys of the washed out Chandeleur Islands, an arc of barrier islands off the coast of Louisiana, found nesting grounds for brown pelicans, royal terns, sandwich terns and black skimmers gone.

“Hopefully the birds will be resilient enough to move to other areas,” said Tom Hess, a biologist with the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. “We will have to see.”

Salt water spread by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita killed marsh grasses across the Louisiana coast, leaving little to eat for Louisiana's most hunted bird — the duck.

Katrina and Rita didn't only kill plants. They annihilated more than 100 square miles of wetlands in Louisiana alone, scattering huge chunks of soft marshy earth.

A lot of things are happening under the water, too.

With their towering waves — well over 50 feet high during Katrina — hurricanes move huge volumes of mud and sediment on the ocean bottom, burying clam and oyster beds and seagrass meadows where crabs, shrimps and fish hide and feed. Can the sea plants spring back?

“It depends on the light penetration, how deep they are buried, and factors like that,” said John Dindo, a marine scientist and assistant director of the Dauphin Island Sea Lab in Alabama.

Farther out, where the continental shelf drops off, the wild seas kicked up by the hurricanes damaged the Gulf's coral reefs.

Coral reefs are resilient, for the most part, but like much else in nature along the Gulf Coast they could be devastated by an onslaught of powerful hurricanes and warming seas. A coral reef near Jamaica, for example, was wiped out by Hurricane Allen in 1980, Schmahl said.

“If they're hit continually with a whole variety of stressors they may not be able to recover, and that's the big concern right now,” he said.

“Most of the marsh where that salt water sat for a long time looks dead. It looks like it is does extremely late in the winter and you've had several extreme frosts,” said Robert Helm, a state waterfowl biologist. “Where we found birds, they seemed to be concentrated in the habitat that was not impacted by the storm.”

The Gulf, scientists say, won't turn into an environmental wasteland, but it could be less rich in flora and fauna.

Duck hunters ask themselves: If Louisiana's abundant wetlands keep getting knocked out, will the ducks head to greener fields?

“You don't go to the restaurant, find it empty, and hang around,” said Charlie Smith, a duck hunter.

Among fish, species shift locations when runoff from towns, septic systems and farms causes algae blooms or storms change salinity levels in coastal bays and channels. Still, not all changes are detrimental: When Gulf commercial and recreational fishermen are knocked out of the water in storms, overfished species like the red snapper get some breathing room.

Nor are the effects confined to the water or the shoreline. Go inland, and millions of trees — cypress, gum, pine, oak — were snapped like toothpicks. Wild fires fueled by fallen timber break out and kill even more trees. And plant diseases like citrus canker and soybean rust can be spread by hurricanes from one region to the next.

The Gulf is in the midst of flux — heavily developed, heavily fished and buffeted by climate change and storms. It's becoming a perfect place for oceanographers, marine biologists, geologists and geographers to study, said Steven F. DiMarco, an ocean researcher Texas A&M University.

“I think,” he said, “people are looking to the Gulf of Mexico ever more as a microcosm of the world.”

“The hurricanes may have changed habitat in ways that we have not even begun to assess,” said Harriet Perry, a fishery expert with the University of Southern Mississippi.

After Rita's 30-plus-foot waves, surveys of the coral at the Flower Garden Banks National Marine Sanctuary 100 miles off the coast of Louisiana and Texas showed damage to about 5 percent of the reef. Brain and star coral was toppled and smashed into other coral heads. About 3 feet of sand was dispersed on sand flats in the reef where trigger fish and queen conch burrow and nest.

Also, a large plume of contaminated runoff from the mainland's towns and industries befouled the reef for a couple of days, said G.P. Schmahl, the sanctuary's manager.

Link to Reference: Larry Wheeler, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, 1/29/06

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- More disasters of Hurricane Katrina-proportions are certain because the United States has no policy to control growth in danger zones at the water's edge.
- The number of Americans living near the shore increased by 23.6 million between 1980 and 2005
- concluded many coastal watersheds may trip from healthy to damaged over the next two decades unless coast communities adopt growth policies that slow land consumption and minimize polluted runoff from impervious surfaces.


More disasters of Hurricane Katrina-proportions are certain because the United States has no policy to control growth in danger zones at the water's edge.

In a single generation, a slow-moving crisis has developed as land along the nation's fragile coasts has been gobbled up, concentrating wealth at the shore and putting at risk millions of people and property valued in the billions.

Dense development
The number of Americans living near the shore increased by 23.6 million between 1980 and 2005, according to a Gannett News Service analysis of population trends in counties nearest the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes. From the air, the footprint of coastal sprawl is unmistakable -- vast tracts of newly built houses stretch for miles. Ribbons of asphalt are crowded with shopping centers, gas stations, restaurants and other buildings.

If runaway land consumption and relentless growth in automobile use continue, many healthy shore communities could face sharp declines over the next 25 years, says Dana Beach, director of the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League and an authority on coastal sprawl. He is especially concerned about developing and paving over land that drains into nearby bodies of water.

Beach authored a report for the Pew Oceans Commission that concluded many coastal watersheds may trip from healthy to damaged over the next two decades unless coast communities adopt growth policies that slow land consumption and minimize polluted runoff from impervious surfaces.

"Part of the dilemma is that there is vast ignorance across the country about ecology," Beach said. "When we modify watersheds (with roads and buildings), we are changing the physical attributes, the biological attributes of the water bodies embedded in those watersheds."

Concerns about Charleston's rapid pace of growth brought more than 100 local residents to a town council meeting one November evening in nearby Mount Pleasant.

Many spoke passionately against a town annexation proposal that could have opened the door to new homes, roads and shopping centers at the entrance to the region's ecological crown jewel -- the Francis Marion National Forest.

"Money isn't everything," said Kathie Livingston, an eco-tourism operator who lives in a small community inside the forest boundaries. "Any more annexation will be detrimental to the environment."

In some coastal areas, especially the urbanized mid-Atlantic, the Northeast and the Rust Belt states bordering the Great Lakes, much waterfront land is covered with roads, parking lots and rooftops -- all impervious surfaces.

Once more than 10 percent of the acreage of a watershed is no longer porous, creeks, rivers, streams and other water bodies seriously degrade, said Beach.

Runoff from parking lots and roads harm coastal waters by adding silt and debris that smother plants, promote algae growth and alter the habitat so it can no longer support fish, crabs and other creatures.

Coastal sprawl is consuming land far faster than the underlying rate of population growth, Beach said.

"It should be a warning sign," he said. "It ought to inspire us to do something."

For the most part, local governments control land-use decisions and are constantly forced to choose between the rights of property owners who want maximum value for their land and other community voices calling for restraint.

Paul Riddick, a funeral home owner and city councilman, said growth has been good for Norfolk, Va., a historic Navy town.

"Norfolk is going through its second phase of urban renewal," said Riddick, a lifelong resident of the city and former president of the Norfolk Branch of National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. "We have so many condos being built that you can't imagine it."

Indeed, gritty bars and cheap garden apartments are rapidly giving way to award-winning seaside developments with big-city price tags.

Change carries a price. "We're seeing a lot of whites coming into certain communities that once were white, changed to black and now they are changing back again," said Riddick, who was the lead plaintiff in a lawsuit against the city school board to prevent the return of segregated elementary schools.

Norfolk officials say they plan to spearhead construction of low-cost homes for working-class families.

Damaging estuaries

Most coastal communities recognize their bays and estuaries are in severe decline after decades of growth have eliminated sensitive wetlands and polluted the waters.

The 3,000-square-mile Gulf of Mexico "dead zone" off the Texas-Louisiana coast is well-known. Aquatic life there has perished. Spawning has halted.

Texas officials are trying to prevent further loss of habitat by limiting development along the 367-mile coast, through state and federal coastal and wetland protection programs, according to the state's Center for Policy Studies and Environmental Defense.

In the mid-Atlantic, the Chesapeake Bay has been plagued by problems.

In November, regional leaders agreed to pursue state and federal regulations that would require farmers to handle their animal feed and waste in a more environmentally sensitive way.

"This year has been a turning point for the Chesapeake Bay," said Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell. He also is the chairman of the Chesapeake Executive Council.

The group's goal: to get the Environmental Protection Agency to remove the Chesapeake and its tributaries from the agency's list of impaired waters by 2010.

Hazardous bacterial contamination caused more than 20,000 closings and health advisory days at beaches across the country in 2004, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council's most recent report.

That's the most since the environmental group began tracking the problem 15 years ago, said Nancy Stoner, director of the council's Clean Water Project, although some of the increase is due to greater monitoring.

Patchwork of programs

The federal government has a patchwork of regulations and agencies that focus on pollution, flood control, the environment and growth patterns.

Some federal efforts like the National Flood Insurance Program and beach restoration projects run by the Army Corps of Engineers contribute to the growth of waterfront communities.

The value of property covered by the flood program is $555 billion, more than five times what it was 25 years ago. It generates approximately $2 billion in annual revenues, mostly from premium payments.

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how a single disaster can overwhelm the flood program.

The federal government's lead agency on ocean and coastal issues now offers programs to help shore communities learn about the natural disasters that threaten them so they can make smarter decisions about future growth.

However, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's budget has remained relatively flat since 2000, limiting the reach of its small teams of coastal specialists. The agency's budget for the current year is $3.86 billion, down 4 percent from 2005.

Nevertheless, NOAA has teamed up with experts at the Environmental Protection Agency to address the problem.

Natives displaced

Many beach communities have evolved into playgrounds for the wealthy, creating a new underclass of workers who can't afford to live in the areas.

Karen Krafft, a single mother with two children, is typical.

She can barely make ends meet living in Nags Head, N.C. She works as a credit counselor. Her annual salary is $25,000. On summer weekends she cleans vacation homes for extra money.

"Unfortunately, I don't have a positive outlook on the Outer Banks because it is such a struggle," Krafft said. "It's beautiful here and I'm fortunate to live near my family. But I work seven days a week."

Krafft's story is not unusual, said Charles Colgan, chief economist for NOAA's National Ocean Economics Program.

Colgan has traced the roots of America's love affair with the coast to the economic boom the nation enjoyed following World War II.

"The bulk of the growth in coastal areas came about as a result of a wealthier society that has a very high taste for the ocean," Colgan said.

Solutions await action

In its final report, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy made more than 200 recommendations to highlight coastal issues and coordinate 11 Cabinet-level departments and four independent agencies that oversee some portion of the nation's ocean and coastal policy.

The ambitious agenda has received little attention from the White House or Congress.

President Bush partially followed one recommendation and formed a Cabinet-level Committee on Ocean Policy, which mostly serves as a clearinghouse for information on existing programs.

"The jury is still out," said the commission's Watkins, who has formed an interest group to continue pressuring Congress and the administration.

"The oceans are no longer the eternal cesspool for mankind. They can't handle it anymore."

Link to Reference: Larry Wheeler, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, January 29, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- More disasters of Hurricane Katrina-proportions are certain because the United States has no policy to control growth in danger zones at the water's edge.
- A slow-moving crisis has developed as land along the nation's fragile coasts has been gobbled up, concentrating wealth at the shore and putting at risk millions of people and property valued in the billions.
- Pew Oceans Commission that concluded many coastal watersheds may trip from healthy to damaged over the next two decades unless coast communities adopt growth policies that slow land consumption and minimize polluted runoff from impervious surfaces.

More disasters of Hurricane Katrina-proportions are certain because the United States has no policy to control growth in danger zones at the water's edge.

In a single generation, a slow-moving crisis has developed as land along the nation's fragile coasts has been gobbled up, concentrating wealth at the shore and putting at risk millions of people and property valued in the billions.

Dense development

The number of Americans living near the shore increased by 23.6 million between 1980 and 2005, according to a Gannett News Service analysis of population trends in counties nearest the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes. From the air, the footprint of coastal sprawl is unmistakable -- vast tracts of newly built houses stretch for miles. Ribbons of asphalt are crowded with shopping centers, gas stations, restaurants and other buildings.

If runaway land consumption and relentless growth in automobile use continue, many healthy shore communities could face sharp declines over the next 25 years, says Dana Beach, director of the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League and an authority on coastal sprawl. He is especially concerned about developing and paving over land that drains into nearby bodies of water.

Beach authored a report for the Pew Oceans Commission that concluded many coastal watersheds may trip from healthy to damaged over the next two decades unless coast communities adopt growth policies that slow land consumption and minimize polluted runoff from impervious surfaces.

"Part of the dilemma is that there is vast ignorance across the country about ecology," Beach said. "When we modify watersheds (with roads and buildings), we are changing the physical attributes, the biological attributes of the water bodies embedded in those watersheds."

Concerns about Charleston's rapid pace of growth brought more than 100 local residents to a town council meeting one November evening in nearby Mount Pleasant.

Many spoke passionately against a town annexation proposal that could have opened the door to new homes, roads and shopping centers at the entrance to the region's ecological crown jewel -- the Francis Marion National Forest.

"Money isn't everything," said Kathie Livingston, an eco-tourism operator who lives in a small community inside the forest boundaries. "Any more annexation will be detrimental to the environment."

In some coastal areas, especially the urbanized mid-Atlantic, the Northeast and the Rust Belt states bordering the Great Lakes, much waterfront land is covered with roads, parking lots and rooftops -- all impervious surfaces.

Once more than 10 percent of the acreage of a watershed is no longer porous, creeks, rivers, streams and other water bodies seriously degrade, said Beach.

Runoff from parking lots and roads harm coastal waters by adding silt and debris that smother plants, promote algae growth and alter the habitat so it can no longer support fish, crabs and other creatures.

Coastal sprawl is consuming land far faster than the underlying rate of population growth, Beach said.

"It should be a warning sign," he said. "It ought to inspire us to do something."

For the most part, local governments control land-use decisions and are constantly forced to choose between the rights of property owners who want maximum value for their land and other community voices calling for restraint.

Paul Riddick, a funeral home owner and city councilman, said growth has been good for Norfolk, Va., a historic Navy town.

"Norfolk is going through its second phase of urban renewal," said Riddick, a lifelong resident of the city and former president of the Norfolk Branch of National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. "We have so many condos being built that you can't imagine it."

Indeed, gritty bars and cheap garden apartments are rapidly giving way to award-winning seaside developments with big-city price tags.

Change carries a price. "We're seeing a lot of whites coming into certain communities that once were white, changed to black and now they are changing back again," said Riddick, who was the lead plaintiff in a lawsuit against the city school board to prevent the return of segregated elementary schools.

Norfolk officials say they plan to spearhead construction of low-cost homes for working-class families.

Damaging estuaries

Most coastal communities recognize their bays and estuaries are in severe decline after decades of growth have eliminated sensitive wetlands and polluted the waters.

The 3,000-square-mile Gulf of Mexico "dead zone" off the Texas-Louisiana coast is well-known. Aquatic life there has perished. Spawning has halted.

Texas officials are trying to prevent further loss of habitat by limiting development along the 367-mile coast, through state and federal coastal and wetland protection programs, according to the state's Center for Policy Studies and Environmental Defense.

In the mid-Atlantic, the Chesapeake Bay has been plagued by problems.

In November, regional leaders agreed to pursue state and federal regulations that would require farmers to handle their animal feed and waste in a more environmentally sensitive way.

"This year has been a turning point for the Chesapeake Bay," said Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell. He also is the chairman of the Chesapeake Executive Council.

The group's goal: to get the Environmental Protection Agency to remove the Chesapeake and its tributaries from the agency's list of impaired waters by 2010.

Hazardous bacterial contamination caused more than 20,000 closings and health advisory days at beaches across the country in 2004, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council's most recent report.

That's the most since the environmental group began tracking the problem 15 years ago, said Nancy Stoner, director of the council's Clean Water Project, although some of the increase is due to greater monitoring.

Patchwork of programs

The federal government has a patchwork of regulations and agencies that focus on pollution, flood control, the environment and growth patterns.

Some federal efforts like the National Flood Insurance Program and beach restoration projects run by the Army Corps of Engineers contribute to the growth of waterfront communities.

The value of property covered by the flood program is $555 billion, more than five times what it was 25 years ago. It generates approximately $2 billion in annual revenues, mostly from premium payments.

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how a single disaster can overwhelm the flood program.

The federal government's lead agency on ocean and coastal issues now offers programs to help shore communities learn about the natural disasters that threaten them so they can make smarter decisions about future growth.

However, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's budget has remained relatively flat since 2000, limiting the reach of its small teams of coastal specialists. The agency's budget for the current year is $3.86 billion, down 4 percent from 2005.

Nevertheless, NOAA has teamed up with experts at the Environmental Protection Agency to address the problem.

Natives displaced

Many beach communities have evolved into playgrounds for the wealthy, creating a new underclass of workers who can't afford to live in the areas.

Karen Krafft, a single mother with two children, is typical.

She can barely make ends meet living in Nags Head, N.C. She works as a credit counselor. Her annual salary is $25,000. On summer weekends she cleans vacation homes for extra money.

"Unfortunately, I don't have a positive outlook on the Outer Banks because it is such a struggle," Krafft said. "It's beautiful here and I'm fortunate to live near my family. But I work seven days a week."

Krafft's story is not unusual, said Charles Colgan, chief economist for NOAA's National Ocean Economics Program.

Colgan has traced the roots of America's love affair with the coast to the economic boom the nation enjoyed following World War II.

"The bulk of the growth in coastal areas came about as a result of a wealthier society that has a very high taste for the ocean," Colgan said.

Solutions await action

In its final report, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy made more than 200 recommendations to highlight coastal issues and coordinate 11 Cabinet-level departments and four independent agencies that oversee some portion of the nation's ocean and coastal policy.

The ambitious agenda has received little attention from the White House or Congress.

President Bush partially followed one recommendation and formed a Cabinet-level Committee on Ocean Policy, which mostly serves as a clearinghouse for information on existing programs.

"The jury is still out," said the commission's Watkins, who has formed an interest group to continue pressuring Congress and the administration.

"The oceans are no longer the eternal cesspool for mankind. They can't handle it anymore."

Link to Reference: John Pope, Staff writer, January 23, 2006

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- Even though the insects breed in water, the storms flushed out the stagnant areas they like for breeding, killed adult mosquitoes, washed away larvae and killed or dispersed the birds that carry West Nile after mosquitoes bite them, state epidemiologist Raoult Ratard said.
- To keep from being bitten by infected mosquitoes, health officials recommend staying inside around dusk and dawn, when the insects swarm; covering arms and legs; getting rid of standing water; and using repellent with DEET.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita pounded southern Louisiana last year, but the water they dumped on the state did not lead to a surge in West Nile virus infections, according to the state health department's year-end report on the mosquito-borne disease.

Even though the insects breed in water, the storms flushed out the stagnant areas they like for breeding, killed adult mosquitoes, washed away larvae and killed or dispersed the birds that carry West Nile after mosquitoes bite them, state epidemiologist Raoult Ratard said.

According to the summary, which was released Friday, 177 Louisianians were infected with West Nile last year and 10 people died from its complications, which can include inflammation of the brain and spinal cord.

The last case count represented an increase of 22 infections since the previous report in mid-November.

There were only scattered reports of infections last year in the New Orleans area, where Katrina struck, and southwest Louisiana, where Rita roared ashore, Ratard said.

The most cases last year were in Caddo Parish, in Louisiana's northwest corner, which logged 24 cases, and East Baton Rouge Parish, where 23 infections were reported. In the seven-parish New Orleans area, there were 26 infections and one death, which occurred in Orleans Parish in July.

The statewide case total was the highest since 2002, when West Nile infections were first reported in Louisiana. In that year, there were 329 cases and 25 deaths.

In 2003, there were 122 cases and seven West Nile-related deaths, according to the Department of Health and Hospitals, and in 2004, 114 infections and seven deaths were reported.

Other mosquito-borne infections found in Louisiana last year included a case of St. Louis encephalitis in Orleans Parish, a diagnosis of eastern equine encephalitis in St. John the Baptist Parish and one LaCrosse virus infection in St. Tammany Parish.

The viruses are in the same family as West Nile, health department spokesman Kristen Meyer said, and they all start with the same flulike symptoms.

Sometimes the differences between the illnesses can be so difficult to detect that a laboratory test may be required to make a diagnosis, she said.

To keep from being bitten by infected mosquitoes, health officials recommend staying inside around dusk and dawn, when the insects swarm; covering arms and legs; getting rid of standing water; and using repellent with DEET.

Link to Reference: Claudia Copeland, Specialist in Resources and Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division. October 19, 2005

Return to: watercenter.org sciencefaircenter.com watercenter.net

Highlights:
- Throughout the Gulf Coast region, Hurricane Katrina’s high winds and water
damaged a wide range of public service facilities, including drinking water supply and
treatment and sewage treatment plants, and restoring those facilities is part of the overall
cleanup and restoration process.
- Damages at many water infrastructure facilities as a result of Hurricane Katrina
included loss of electric power to pump, process, and treat raw water supply and
wastewater.
-
Summary
Throughout the Gulf Coast region, Hurricane Katrina’s high winds and water
damaged a wide range of public service facilities, including drinking water supply and
treatment and sewage treatment plants, and restoring those facilities is part of the overall
cleanup and restoration process. This report describes information that has been
gathered about impacts of the August 29 hurricane on drinking water and wastewater
treatment facilities and on ongoing efforts to assess damages and needs to repair and
reconstruct damaged systems. Facility restorations may take many months, and costs
of needed repairs are unknown for now. To meet those needs, affected communities are
likely to rely heavily on federal assistance in emergency appropriations acts, as well as
traditional water infrastructure programs, principally those administered by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The
Senate has passed a bill intended to streamline delivery of funds through existing EPA
programs to repair storm-damaged sewage treatment and drinking water plants (S.
1709). Also, legislation has been introduced that would provide hurricane assistance to
Louisiana, including $5 billion for water infrastructure projects (S. 1765/S. 1766, H.R.
3958). This report will be updated as events warrant.

Water Infrastructure Facilities Affected by Hurricane Katrina
Damages at many water infrastructure facilities as a result of Hurricane Katrina
included loss of electric power to pump, process, and treat raw water supply and
wastewater. Initially following the storm, some plants were able to operate temporarily
on backup generators, so long as fuel was available. In addition, flooding disabled
services in a number of locations, including New Orleans. Overall, a large number of
systems were affected. For example, within a few days after the hurricane, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that more than 1,220 drinking water
systems (many of them very small, in terms of customers served) and more than 200
wastewater treatment facilities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama had been affected.
CRS-2
1 Detailed information, updated often, is available on EPA’s Web site at:
[http://www.epa.gov/katrina/activities.html].
As electric power was restored, many of the affected systems have been able to
restore needed services (especially facilities in Alabama, which was not in the center of
the storm’s path). Two weeks after Hurricane Katrina, EPA reported that about 30% of
the affected drinking water and 40% of the affected wastewater facilities were again
operating. However, many of the inoperable drinking water and wastewater plants serve
large numbers of customers. In Biloxi, for example, officials were unable to re-pressurize
the drinking water system because of broken and inaccessible water mains and valves.
One-third of the sewage treatment facilities in Harrison County, Mississippi (serving
Biloxi, Gulfport, Long Beach, and Pass Christian) were destroyed or very severely
damaged. Similarly, drinking water and sewage service for more than a million customers
in New Orleans (discussed below) was severely disrupted.
EPA reported that by October 10 — and following a second hurricane, Hurricane
Rita, that hit Texas and parts of Louisiana on September 24 — more than 85% of drinking
water and 95% of wastewater treatment facilities in the region were operational.1
However, as of that date, 131 drinking water systems (67 in Louisiana and 64 in
Mississippi) were operating on a boil water notice pending test results to ensure that the
water has been restored to standards safe for public consumption, and 175 others (142 in
Louisiana and 33 in Mississippi) serving about 200,000 consumers were either inoperable
or their status was unknown. All drinking water facilities in Alabama were reported to
be operational. In Texas, 45% of drinking water facilities were operational two weeks
after Hurricane Rita, and the remainder were operating on a boil water notice, were not
operating, or were still being investigated.
Also as of October 10, 22 sewage treatment plants in Louisiana serving more than
half a million customers were not operational or were reported to be experiencing
operational difficulties. Wastewater plants in Mississippi and Alabama were operational.
In Texas, 84% of wastewater treatment plants were operational. Staff of EPA’s Water
Program are preparing to assess all drinking water and wastewater plants in the region,
including more than 900 facilities in Louisiana and Mississippi that are located in areas
that were unaffected by Hurricane Katrina.
For damaged facilities, steps involved in restoring service include drying out and
cleaning engines and pumps; testing and repairing waterlogged electrical systems; testing
for toxic chemicals and harmful bacteria that may have infiltrated pipes and plants;
restoring pressure (drinking water distribution systems); activating disinfection units;
restoring bacteria needed to treat wastes (wastewater plants); and cleaning, repairing, and
flushing distribution and sewer lines.
Impacts of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans’s water system were particularly
severe. Some parts of the city did not experience interrupted service, while other parts
where water was available were advised that it should only be used for flushing toilets and
fighting fires. But in the central portion of the city, in addition to electric power
impairments, extensive damage occurred to the water infrastructure from flooding of
treatment plants, drinking water distribution lines, collector and interceptor sewers, and
CRS-3
2 Much of the New Orleans water infrastructure was built more than 75 years ago. Even before
the hurricane, the Sewerage and Water Board, which is responsible for providing drinking water,
sewage treatment, and drainage services to more than one million customers, had a $1 billion
capital improvement program to address long-term maintenance and repair needs, including
compliance with a 1998 court-ordered sewer system consent decree
3 Section 502(6) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, codified predominantly
at 6 U.S.C. §§101-557 ) authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to consolidate federal
government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated National Response Plan (NRP),
the framework to coordinate activities of the federal government with those of state, local, and
tribal governments and the private sector. It is organized by 15 Emergency Support Functions,
such as public works and engineering, public health, and oil and hazardous materials response,
each with a designated coordinator, primary agencies, and support agencies. The text of the NRP
is available at: [http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRPbaseplan.pdf].
the water system’s powerplant.2 Even after restoration of electricity, cleanup and recovery
at flooded water and sewage treatment plants is likely to take considerable time. The
largest of the city’s two drinking water plants, located where the worst flooding took
place, was completely underwater for nearly two weeks. It was repaired sufficiently to
provide flow (i.e., for fire fighting), but may not be providing potable water for weeks,
officials say.
For flooded areas, sewage treatment often is the last thing back on line, because
plants are at the lowest point of the city and thus under the deepest water. Ne